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Abstract
This paper explores the welfare eﬀects of international subsidies de-
signed to expedite the production of global public goods. It distinguishes
between the impact subsidies exert on behaviour and the impact subsidies
exert on welfare. Subsidies that encourage recipients to contribute to the
provision of global public goods can be designed to maximise the welfare
of donor countries. While these ‘optimal’ subsidies achieve a Pareto eﬃ-
cient allocation of resources, all the eﬃciency gains are appropriated by
donor countries. If equity is irrelevant, ‘optimal’ subsidies are higher for
high-income recipients than for low-income recipients.
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1. Introduction
Nation states must act collectively if they are to make a meaningful response to
global challenges. Global challenges take diﬀerent forms. Diseases are dissemi-
nated internationally, financial instabilities are transmitted across integrated mar-
kets and climate changes threaten the world environment. Nation states produce
‘global public goods’ when their response provides benefits that are experienced
worldwide (Sandler 2003:131).
Nation states’ willingness to act collectively depends on the nature of the public
good to be produced (Sandler 2004) and on incentives provided by international
treaties. International collaboration is more successful when treaties oﬀer side-
payments to mobilise collective action (e.g. Barrett 1999, 2003). The Montreal
Protocol oﬀers assistance to countries that agree to reduce emissions from ozone-
depleting substances. The Global Environmental Facility assists countries that
use expensive substitutes for fossil fuels and practice energy conservation. The
Group of Seven and the European Union oﬀers subsidies to countries to reduce the
risk of nuclear accidents. The World Heritage Fund provides subsidies to countries
to protect their national heritage when this also generates global benefits. More
recently, the U.N. Climate Change Conference at Cancun has agreed to establish
a Green Climate Fund and, by 2020, this Fund will disburse $100 billion to help
countries reduce carbon emissions and to help countries adapt to climate change.
The extent to which these subsidies can be described as ‘aid’ is moot. When
King (2006:371) reflected on subsidies oﬀered to cover ‘incremental costs’ (i.e. the
"...additional costs of pursuing one course of action rather than another.."), he
insisted that these payments "...are not conventional aid..."; they are provided to
make "...international co-operation more incentive compatible". Sandler (1997)
drew attention to the proportion of bilateral and multilateral aid transfers that are
oﬀered to encourage developing countries to contribute to the provision of global
public goods (e.g. to encourage developing countries to sustain rain forests, or
to administer the vaccination programmes required to eradicate disease). These
transfers are increasing as a share of oﬃcial overseas development assistance, but
it is far from obvious that they should be described as ‘aid’ (Raﬀer 1999; te Velde
et al 2002; World Bank 2001, Anand 2006; UNIDO 2008).
In this paper the objective is to explore the welfare eﬀects of international
subsidies oﬀered to mobilise collective action. Will they increase the provision of
a global public good? Will they achieve a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation of resources?
Will they ensure that every nation state that responds to a global challenge re-
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ceives a meaningful share of the eﬃciency gains delivered by collective action?
An established literature already explores the impact of income redistribution
on the supply of a public good. Some question whether lump sum transfers are
likely to have any impact at all (e.g. Warr 1983; Bergstrom et al 1986). Others
focus on the question of whether governments are able to rely on distortionary
taxation to increase the supply of a public good (e.g. Bernheim 1986). In this
context, Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) demonstrate that governments can of-
fer tax-financed subsidies to increase the provision of a public good if voluntary
contributors take the government’s budget constraint into account.
This paper has a narrower remit. It focuses on voluntary co-operation between
nation states that respect each others’ national sovereignty (there is no ‘interna-
tional government’ able to levy coercive taxation). In this paper the question is
whether treaties and aid packages can be designed to mobilise collective action.
The intention is to analyse the impact of subsidies in treaties when treaties are
analysed as stylised ‘tax subsidy’ arrangements.
In the absence of an international government, ‘tax’ is the cost that the nation
state incurs when it voluntarily signs a treaty. It is possible to analyse treaties that
impose a cost as a ‘tax’ payment to a common budget (to finance the provision
of a global public good). It is also possible to analyse treaties that impose a ‘tax’
(more generally) as a direct cost that must be incurred to fulfil treaty obligations.
As an example, consider the cost that nation states incur when they agree to
reduce carbon emissions (in order to fulfil their obligations to an international
environment treaty). The same stylised ‘tax subsidy’ model can be applied if
nation states make tax payments to a common fund, or if nation states incur
‘tax costs’ as direct contributions to provide a public good. This paper analyses
‘tax costs’ as contributions to produce a global public good with a summation
technology (Sandler 2004).
The next section of the paper illustrates the main issues by focussing on the
cost-sharing arrangement implicit in an international treaty. A developed country
(country 1) is able to oﬀer a cost-sharing arrangement to induce a developing
country (country 2) to make a contribution to the provision of a global public
good, even when the developing country is able to free-ride on the provision of
the global public good by the developed country. Studies have already considered
the impact of cost-sharing arrangements on the supply of a public good (Guttman
1978; 1987 considers a cost-sharing arrangement in a two-stage game) but, in this
paper, the intention is to focus on the distribution of the eﬃciency gains that
collective action can deliver.
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Section three of the paper considers the properties of the ‘tax subsidy’ arrange-
ment that mobilises collective action to deliver all of the eﬃciency gains to the
country that pays the subsidy. The two-country model is generalised to an n
country model. Counter-intuitively, only the ‘donor’ country (the country that
pays the subsidy) gains (even though collective action successfully produces a
Pareto-eﬃcient quantity of the public good).
Section four of the paper focuses on the pattern of subsidies when donor coun-
tries mobilise collective action and appropriate all of the eﬃciency gains. The
pattern of subsidies diﬀers systematically from the pattern that would emerge if
donor countries’ only concern was to alleviate poverty in developing countries.
More generally, section five of the paper considers the properties of interna-
tional treaties that mobilise collective action to deliver a meaningful share of the
welfare gains to every country that acts collectively.
Commentators are critical that international subsidies oﬀered to developing
countries to induce them to act collectively are not really oﬀering ‘aid’. They
are concerned that these subsidies are displacing ‘conventional aid’. This paper
identifies an even more worrying concern. International subsidies can be oﬀered
to mobilise developing countries and to maximise the welfare of the countries that
pay the subsidies. They can be designed to deliver all of the eﬃciency gains to the
countries that pay the subsidies. This observation is important. It is not suﬃcient
to argue that citizens in developing countries value the global public good. It is
not suﬃcient to argue that countries that receive subsidies are always able to
reject the oﬀer of subsidies. The message to policymakers is that it is necessary
to examine the properties of ‘tax subsidy’ arrangements implicit in international
treaties. When are they likely to mobilise collective action? When are they
likely to deliver all of the welfare gains to the nation states that pay international
subsidies?
2. International subsidies to mobilise developing countries.
In this section of the paper the intention is to illustrate the welfare eﬀects of a
subsidy oﬀered by a developed country (country 1) to encourage a developing
country (country 2) to contribute to the provision of a global public good (x). In
countries 1 and 2, citizens derive utility from a global public good x and from a
private good y. We follow the usual convention by assuming that each country
maximises a utility function that is “. . . representative of the welfare of the nation’s
population” (Sandler 1993:449).
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To begin, consider the way that a developed country might induce a developing
country to contribute to the provision of x even though the developed country
already provides x¯ unilaterally. Let m1 and m2 denote the incomes of countries 1
and 2. The utility levels of the two countries are:
u1(x¯,m1 − x¯) = u¯1 (2.1)
u2(x¯,m2) = u¯2 (2.2)
where we assume that the marginal cost of production is equal to one. This
starting point resembles the problem discussed by developed countries at the
UN Climate Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun. Many developed countries
are already committed to measures to reduce carbon emissions (as signatories
to the Kyoto Protocol). At the Copenhagen Conference (December 2009) their
objective was to encourage developing countries to make a similar commitment.
They decided to oﬀer developing countries subsidies if developing countries would
also agree to incur costs to mitigate the problem of ‘global warming’.
In Figure 1 the marginal cost of providing the global public good (x) is MC.
Country 1, or country 2, can pay the full marginal costs of providing the good,
or both can agree to share the marginal cost. If they agree to share the marginal
costs, country 1 would pay a cost-share between τ 01 and τ
100
1 (on the vertical axis)
and country 2 would pay the remaining cost-share between (1−τ 01) and (1−τ 1001 ).
The indiﬀerence curves illustrate the preferences of each country. At any
output, country 1 is better oﬀ on indiﬀerence curve I21 than on I
1
1 because country
1 pays a lower tax share for each unit of x (conversely, at any output, country
2 is worse oﬀ on indiﬀerence curves that lie below I12 ). The initial situation is
point a. Country 1 provides x1 = x¯ units (at point a country 1’s marginal benefit
of the public good equals marginal cost). At point a country 2 benefits as a free
rider. Can a cost-sharing arrangement be designed to induce country 2 to act
collectively?
Both countries might enjoy a higher welfare level by acting collectively. There
are potential eﬃciency gains if they agree to share costs to produce a higher level
of output. In Figure 1 each country can achieve a higher level of welfare in the
ellipse described between points a and c. These eﬃciency gains are maximised if
countries chose a cost-sharing arrangement at a point on the contract curve (not
drawn) in the ellipse. When the slopes of the indiﬀerence curves are identical,
Samuelson’s (1954) conditions are satisfied (Mueller 2003).
The question is whether there is a process that will mobilise collective action.
In theory, it is possible to rely on the process described by Lindahl (1919). An
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impartial ‘auctioneer’ suggests a cost-sharing arrangement and asks each country
if it prefers more, or less, of the public good. By a tâtonnement process, the
auctioneer increases the cost-share for the country that prefers a higher output of
the public good, and decreases the cost-share for the country that prefers a lower
output. If there is a cost-sharing arrangement at which neither country has a
preference for more, or less, of the good, the outcome is Pareto optimal (Johansen
1963). The cost-shares are Lindahl prices; at these prices each nation state equates
its marginal benefit to its marginal cost. To achieve a Lindahl equilibrium, each
country must answer honestly, even though there are incentives to under-reveal
demand (Cornes and Sandler 1996).
By comparison, the process considered in this paper is quite diﬀerent. In
the first instance, it is the developed country that takes the initiative. As it is
the convention that a donor (prepared to pay the subsidy) oﬀers a subsidy, the
developed country enjoys a first move advantage. The developed country acts as
a Stackelberg leader.1
The second diﬀerence is that, when the developed country sets the subsidy, it
is also able to determine the cost-sharing arrangement. As each country’s cost-
share depends on the mix of tax and subsidy, the developed country is able to set
the subsidy to determine the cost-sharing arrangement (receipt of the subsidy is
contingent on willingness to pay an agreed ‘tax’ contribution to the public good).
If the developed country sets the subsidy to ensure that every nation shares the
eﬃciency gains delivered by collective action, the cost-sharing arrangement will
leave each country on the contract curve within the ellipse (described between
points a and c). However, the developed country can also set the subsidy to
maximise its own welfare on the contract curve at point b in Figure 1.
3. International subsidies that maximize donors’ welfare.
How can a cost-sharing arrangement be produced to mobilise collective action at
point b in Figure 1? In this section of the paper attention focuses on the properties
of a tax-subsidy arrangement to maximize the welfare of the country that pays
the subsidy.
Country 1 and country 2 consume y1 and y2 of the private good. The analysis
is premised on the following assumptions:
1Participation in the Lindahl process is diﬀerent. When the auctioneer suggests diﬀerent
cost-sharing arrangements there is no suggestion that the donor country is more likely to reap
all of the eﬃciency gains.
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[A1] u1(x, y1) and u2(x, y2) are increasing quasi-concave functions.
[A2] the cost function of the public good is linearly increasing and is given by
c(x) = x, where the constant marginal cost of production equals one.
[A3] m1 ≥ m2 and
∂u1
∂x
(x, y1) >
∂u2
∂x
(x, y2) for all x > 0.
[A4]
∂u1
∂x
(0,m1) =∞ for all y1 ≥ 0
[A5] Country 1 makes a once for all (take it or leave it) oﬀer that country 2
accepts or rejects.
[A6] lump-sum transfers of wealth between the two countries are not available.
A1-A2 are standard assumptions that ensure that the first order conditions
for Pareto eﬃciency are suﬃcient. Assumption A3 ensures that in a decentralized
country decision process, (the competitive equilibrium where each country takes
as given the amount of x purchased by the other country), only country 1 spends
on the public good while country 2 free-rides. Assumption A4 ensures that there
is always a finite amount of x consumed. A5 amounts to assuming that the two
countries play a Stackelberg game. This assumption is relaxed in section 5 where
we consider treaties that allow country 2 to be strictly better oﬀ than under (2.2).
In a theoretical world lump-sum contributions T1 and T2 are possible but here
the analysis focuses on tax contributions that are proportional to incomes (m1
and m2) in the two countries. A6 is thus introduced to capture some realism in
international negotiations.
The feature that is common in the treaties analysed in this paper is the per-
unit subsidy s ∈ [0, 1] paid by the developed country to the developing country.
As noted, the ‘tax’ element in the treaty is the cost that a signatory agrees to
incur to produce a global public good. To begin, it is helpful to focus on a ‘tax’
rate, t, that depends on income:
(i) If the costs of providing the global public good are financed by a com-
mon budget, the ‘ tax’ is the payment that each country contributes to the budget.
When the tax rate is t, each country contributes tm1 and tm2 respectively. To-
tal tax revenue (tm1+ tm2) together with the subsidy sx (paid by the developed
country) is available to finance the provision of the global public good.
(ii) If the costs of providing the public good are incurred as direct costs
(to fulfil treaty obligations), the direct contribution costs are tm1 and tm2. These
are the ‘tax costs’ that country 1 and country 2 incur directly (e.g. by reducing
carbon emissions). With a summation technology these contributions, tm1 and
tm2, together with the subsidy sx, are available to produce the global public good.
The analysis begins with the assumption that the developed country will incur
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a higher cost (tm1) than the developing country (tm2). This may often be the case
(e.g. in international environment treaties, the costs of reducing carbon emissions
are likely to be higher in countries that have higher industrial output). It is also
the case that the argument in this paper is stronger if it appears to be the case
that the donor country is willing to accept higher ‘tax’ costs. In section 5 of
the paper this assumption (that nation state contributions are linear functions of
income) can be relaxed.
The first objective is to compare welfare eﬀects when a developed country
‘generously’ oﬀers to incur a higher cost (tm1 > tm2) and to finance a subsidy
sx. If the developed country (country 1) is intent on maximising its own utility,
it will oﬀer a treaty that will (at minimum) maintain country 2’s initial welfare.
If u¯2 is the utility country 2 achieves while free-riding, the resulting participation
constraint from the perspective of country 1 is:
u2[x,m2(1− t)] = u¯2. (3.1)
such that,
dt
dx
|u¯2 =
1
m2
∂u2/∂x
∂u2/∂y2
(3.2)
As this quantity is positive, country 1 will only raise the tax rate t in exchange for
an agreement that there will be a higher level of global activity. If the total cost of
production is simply the sum of individual contributions, the resource constraint
takes the form:
t(m1 +m2) + sx = x (3.3)
The developed country’s objective (country 1) is to maximize, by choice of x, t
and s, its utility function u1[x,m1(1− t)− sx] subject to the above participation
and resource constraints.
When focussing on the properties of the ‘optimal’ tax-subsidy mechanism that
maximises the donor country’s welfare, let µ denote the Lagrange multiplier on
the participation constraint, and let λ denote the corresponding multiplier on the
resource constraint. The associated Lagrangian for the optimum choice of x, t and
s, from the perspective of country 1, can thus be written as follows:
L(x, t, s;µ,λ) = u1[x,m1(1− t)− sx] + (3.4)
+µ [u2[x,m2(1− t)]− u¯2] +
+λ [t(m1 +m2)− x(1− s)]
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First order conditions for the optimum choice of x, t and s entail:
∂L
∂x
=
∂u1
∂x
+ µ
∂u2
∂x
− ∂u1
∂y1
s− λ(1− s) = 0 (3.5)
∂L
∂t
= −m1
∂u1
∂y1
− µm2
∂u2
∂y2
+ λ(m1 +m2) = 0 (3.6)
∂L
∂s
= −∂u1
∂y1
x+ λx = 0 (3.7)
By defining Π (x, y) = ∂u/∂x
∂u/∂y
as the marginal rate of substitution between the
two goods, we obtain the following result (see the appendix for a derivation):
Proposition 3.1 There exists a Pareto eﬃcient treaty (xˆ, tˆ, sˆ) such that the
donor country reaps all the welfare gains. At the point (xˆ, tˆ, sˆ) satisfying the first
order conditions [3.5-3.7] above, we have the equalities
Π1

xˆ,m1(1− tˆ)− sˆxˆ

+Π2

xˆ,m2(1− tˆ)

= 1 (3.8)
λ =
∂u1
∂y1
(3.9)
µ =
∂u1/∂y1
∂u2/∂y2
(3.10)
where Πi is the marginal rate of substitution of country i between the global public
good and disposable income and 1 is the marginal cost of production of the global
public good x.
The role of the subsidy is crucial in ensuring that the Samuelson condition
(3.8) characterizing Pareto eﬃciency of the solution ( xˆ, tˆ, sˆ) is satisfied. In the
absence of a subsidy, s = 0, the first order condition (3.7) does not arise and the
terms s∂u1/∂y1 and λs vanish from (3.5). In the resulting optimum a weighted
sum of the marginal rates of substitution of the two countries is equated to the
marginal cost of production, thus breaking the required Samuelson optimality
condition2. It should then be clear that in the framework of Proposition 3.1, ‘aid’
2More specifically, in the absence of subsidies we obtain
λ = θ1
∂u1
∂y1
+ µθ2
∂u2
∂y2
where θi = mi/(m1 +m2). The optimum level of x then equates the sum of marginal utilities
∂u1
∂x
+ µ
∂u2
∂x
to this resulting value of λ.
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would have little to do with altruism, or caring for country 2. Instead, ‘aid’, i.e.
the subsidy, is used as a corrective mechanism to mitigate the distortion that is
caused by free-riding behaviour.
Define v1(m1,m2, u¯2) = u1( xˆ, tˆ, sˆ) as country 1’s maximized utility function in
relation to the problem (3.4). We state below properties of v1(m1,m2, u¯2) which
will be further explored in the sections below:
Corollary 3.2 Let v1(m1,m2, u¯2) denote country 1’s indirect utility function.
Then
(i)
∂v1
∂m2
= λ > 0
(ii)
∂v1
∂u¯2
= −µ < 0
So that country 1’s welfare is increasing in country 2’s income, and decreasing
in country 2’s reservation utility.
Thus, other things equal, country 1 would benefit more by engaging in a treaty
with a richer free-riding country. Furthermore, since
∂v1
∂u¯2
< 0, there would appear
to be a range of Pareto-eﬃcient treaties, some of which may increase country 2’s
welfare. One such case is a treaty where both countries share the welfare gains
(section 5.)
3.1. A multi-country world.
The above results are robust when generalising the model beyond a two-country
world. We consider a world consisting of two homogeneous groups of countries,
say North and South, where within each group preferences and endowments are
identical 3. Specifically, we assume there are n1 rich countries with incomes m1
and identical preferences u1 (x,m1) and n2 poor countries with incomes m2 and
identical preferences u2 (x,m2) 4.
There are now n2 identical participation constraints, for each type 2 country,
identical to (3.1), while the new resource constraint is of the form:
t (n1m1 + n2m2) = x (1− n1s) (3.11)
3The authors are grateful for the advice that an anonymous referee oﬀered on the approach
that might be employed to analyse an n country model.
4The assumption of two homogeneous groups is further relaxed in section 5 where we consider
various generalisations of our analysis.
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The associated Lagrangian with the global community consisting of n1 rich coun-
tries and n2 poor countries is:
L = u1(x,m1 (1− t)− sx) (3.12)
+µ [u2 (x,m2 (1− t))− u¯2]
+λ [t (n1m1 + n2m2)− x (1− n1s)]
First order conditions for the optimum choice of x, t, and s entail:
∂L
∂x
=
∂u1
∂x
− s∂u1
∂y1
+ µ
∂u2
∂x
− λ(1− n1s) = 0 (3.13)
∂L
∂t
= −m∂u1
∂y1
−m2µ
∂u2
∂y2
+ λ(n1m1 + n2m2) = 0 (3.14)
∂L
∂s
= −∂u1
∂y1
x+ n1λx = 0 (3.15)
Letting Πi denote a representative country is marginal rate of substitution,
we generalize the result of Proposition 3.1 in the context of a multi-country world
as follows:
Proposition 3.3 There exists a Pareto eﬃcient treaty such that the donor
community reaps all the welfare gains. At the point

xˆ, tˆ, sˆ

satisfying the first
order conditions [3.13− 3.15] above, we have the equalities
n1Π1

xˆ,m1

1− tˆ

− sˆxˆ

+ n2Π2

xˆ,m2

1− tˆ

= 1 (3.16)
λ =
1
n1
∂u1
∂y1
(3.17)
µ =
1
n1
∂u1
∂y1
/
1
n2
∂u2
∂y2
(3.18)
Once again, the optimum is the Samuelson condition (3.16) that characterizes
Pareto eﬃciency. The weighted sum of marginal rates of substitution equals the
marginal rate of transformation. The bilateral model (discussed earlier) is helpful
when analysing bilateral aid arrangements. The multi-country model can be em-
ployed when exploring the properties of tax-subsidy arrangements in multilateral
international treaties. The multi-country model illustrates the advantage that de-
veloped countries are able to exploit as countries that oﬀer subsidies (as ‘altruists’,
able to determine implicit cost-sharing arrangements). Even in the multi-country
model, developed countries can oﬀer cost-sharing arrangements that are designed
to maximise their own welfare.
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4. International subsidies when developing countries’ in-
comes increase.
In section 3 of the paper a developed country (country 1) encouraged a devel-
oping country (country 2) to commit resources to provide a public good and to
appropriate all of the eﬃciency gains. How will s and t change as the developing
country becomes richer? How will they change if the marginal utility a developing
country derives from the public good increases at all levels of x?
When we parametrize the utility functions of the two countries using quasi-
linear preferences, income eﬀects are absent from the demand for the global public
good. Once again, the intention is to illustrate the possibility that aid is motivated
by the incentive to mobilise collective action, rather than by any consideration of
international equity. The utility functions of the developed country (country 1)
and the developing country (country 2) are:
u1 (x, y1) = y1 + γ log x (4.1)
u2 (x, y2) = y2 + β log x (4.2)
where γ > β. This means that country 1 derives higher marginal utility from the
global public good at all levels of x.
Under private (national) provision, country 1 provides an amount q¯1 = γ,
whereas country 2 free rides (q¯2 = 0). At this competitive equilibrium x¯ = q¯1+q¯2 =
γ and u¯1 (x, y1) = (m1−γ)+γ log γ while u¯2 (x, y2) = m2+β log γ. The constrained
optimization problem of the previous section using quasi-linear preferences can
be parametrized to describe the ‘optimum’ subsidy country 1 would oﬀer. The
associated Lagrangian is thus:
L(x, t, s;µ,λ) = m1(1− t)− sx+ γ log x+ (4.3)
+µ [m2(1− t) + β log x− u¯2] +
+λ [t(m1 +m2)− x(1− s)]
Assuming the exogenous parameters γ,β,m1,m2 are chosen in a way that the
optimum values of s and t are in the range [0, 1], we can ignore boundary solutions
in the resolution of the above problem. Let θ2 = m2/(m1+m2) denote the income
share of country 2 in the world distribution of income. At a point (xˆ, tˆ, sˆ) satisfying
the first order conditions in relation to the Lagrangian (4.3) we thus obtain:
xˆ = (γ + β) (4.4)
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tˆ =
β
m2
log

xˆ
γ

(4.5)
sˆ = 1−

β
θ2xˆ

log

xˆ
γ

(4.6)
∂u1
∂y1
=
∂u2
∂y2
= λ (4.7)
λ = µ = 1 (4.8)
Note that in the solution to this problem λ = µ = 1. This result is a consequence
of the assumption of quasi-linear preferences where the marginal utility of income
is constant and equal to one at all income levels.
With quasi-linear preferences the optimum price pˆ = (1 − sˆ) is a function
pˆ(1, γ, β, θ2), where 1 is the marginal cost of producing the public good, γ and
β measure the relative valuations of the two countries for the public good 5, and
θ2 = 1 − θ1 is a measure of income inequality in the two-country world. Thus,
pˆ(1, γ, β, θ2) decreases with the income share θ2 of the free-riding country. Other
things equal, the optimum subsidy to a middle-income country would be greater
than the optimum subsidy to a low-income country. This seemingly paradoxical
result is best understood with reference to (3.2). In the absence of income eﬀects
∂u2/∂y2 = 1 and the optimum value xˆ is independent of m2. Thus, the MRS of
country 2 (at constant utility u¯2) becomes flatter as m2 increases. Consequently,
the optimum tˆ that secures country 2’s participation falls, and as a result sˆ must
rise to ensure that the resource constraint is satisfied. On the other hand, ∂sˆ/∂β <
0 : the more the free-riding country values the public good, the higher the price
(1− sˆ) it would be asked to pay. Thus, in this two-country world characterized by
quasi-linear preferences, the optimum subsidy to country 2 is shaped by incentive
considerations, and this is likely to be sharply diﬀerent from subsidies premised
on the usual altruism arguments that are put forward in the aid literature.
Proposition 4.1 At a point ( xˆ, tˆ, sˆ) satisfying the first order conditions in
relation to the Lagrangian (4.3) where countries 1 and 2 have quasi-linear prefer-
ences, the optimum price of the global public good is a function pˆ(1, γ, β, θ2), such
that:
(i) pˆ decreases with the income share θ2 of the free riding country.
Also,
5At any level of global public activity xo,
∂u1/∂x
∂u2/∂x
|x=xo = γ/β.
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(ii) pˆ increases with β, the intensity of the free-riding country’s preference for
the public good.
To illustrate, Table 1 reports the findings of a calibration of the preferences
and endowments of the two countries. Throughout the calibration we set the
preference parameters γ = 1, β = 0.5 and m1 = 3 in relation to (4.1). We report
the optimum values xˆ, tˆ and sˆ as we vary the income share θ2 of the free-rider.
[Insert Table 1 here]
For a given value of β, as country 1 becomes richer the price subsidy sˆ is
increased, while the tax tˆ is reduced. Taking for instance the value β = 0.50, we
have sˆ = 0.46 when θ2 = 0.25, while the price subsidy rises to sˆ = 0.59 when
θ2 = 0.33. From Corollary 3.2, we know that country 1’s welfare rises with m2
so that the increased subsidy is all the more profitable from the perspective of
country 1.
When the welfare of the ‘donor’ country depends on the eﬃciency gains derived
from collective action, the welfare of the ‘donor’ country increases with the income
of the developing country. This prediction (that a higher subsidy will be oﬀered
as the recipient’s income increases) resonates with discussions of the importance
of mobilising such countries as China and India to make a meaningful response
to the challenge of global warming.
As β rises, country 1 reduces the subsidy element and oﬀers a contract with
a higher tˆ. For instance, when β = 0.75 and θ2 = 0.25 (results not shown in the
table), the price subsidy is virtually nil (sˆ = 0.04) while tˆ = 0.42.
5. International treaties designed to share eﬃciency gains.
It is now possible to compare the characteristics of tax-subsidy arrangements that
maximise the welfare of one country (as in sections 2, 3 and 4) with character-
istics of tax-subsidy arrangements that share the gains of collective action. This
section of the paper focuses on outcomes that exist within the ellipse illustrated
in Figure 1. In the empirical calibrations in section 4 the ‘tax’ is relatively large
and the subsidy is relatively small (when the cost-sharing function delivers all of
the eﬃciency gains to the developed country).
Of course, more generally, the policy instruments available to negotiating par-
ties may diﬀer from those that have been considered so far (there may be other
policy instruments than just a price subsidy and a ‘tax’). Also, more generally,
it may not always be possible to achieve Samuelson first best eﬃciency (as there
may also be second best considerations).
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This section of the paper considers a general approach. Firstly, we assume
there are three homogenous groups of countries 6 (say high, middle and low income
countries) of respective sizes n1, n2 and n3.Within a group i = 1, 2, 3, a given coun-
try has a utility function ui(x, yi). In this approach any cost-sharing arrangement
is dependent on three functions Ei(x, η), i = 1, 2, 3, where η is a k−dimensional
vector of parameters (to be chosen optimally) in a way that
3S
i=1
niEi(x, η) = x.
Ei(x, η) is the total amount spent by a representative country i on the global
public good, so that yi = mi −Ei(x, η). In the two-country discussion considered
so far in the paper η = (t, s), E1(x, η) = sx + tm1 and E2(x, η) = tm2. Another
example, discussed in section 2, is one where τ is the cost share of country 1,
E1(x, η) = τx and E2(x, η) = (1− τ)x.
Assume again that only rich countries provide x in the absence of an interna-
tional treaty, and let u¯3 = u3[x,m3] denote the reservation utility of a free-riding
low-income country. An eﬃcient treaty, given the policy instruments Ei(x, η) will
maximize the welfare of the high-income community, u1[x,m1 − E1(x, η)], given
that middle and low income countries are willing to participate in the treaty, i.e.
provided u2[x,m2 − E2(x, η)] = uo2 ≥ u¯2, and u3[x,m3 − E3(x, η)] = uo3 ≥ u¯3. By
varying the levels of uo2 and u
o
3, we can envisage treaties that will share eﬃciency
gains from those that benefit only one party. Set µ1 = 1 and define the Lagrangian
of the problem as follows:
L(x, η;µ2, µ3,λ) = µ1u1[x,m1 −E1(x, η)] + (5.1)
+µ2 [u2[x,m2 −E2(x, η)]− uo2] +
+µ3 [u3[x,m3 −E3(x, η)]− uo3] +
+λ
%
3[
i=1
niEi(x, η)− x
&
There are k + 4 first order conditions: one for the optimum choice of x, the level
of global public activity, one equation in relation to each of the parameters in η,
one pertaining to the resource constraint and, finally, two equations defining the
welfare types 2 and 3 countries derive from the treaty:
∂L
∂x
=
3[
i=1
µi

∂ui
∂x
− ∂ui
∂yi
∂Ei
∂x

+ λ
#
3[
i=1
ni
∂Ei
∂x
− 1
$
= 0 (5.2)
6It will be clear from the first order conditions below that the analysis is equally applicable
in the context of h = 3, 4, ... groups of homogeneous countries. The value of h = 3 is chosen
here for expositional purposes.
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∂L
∂ηj
= −
3[
i=1
µi

∂ui
∂yi
∂Ei
∂ηj

+ λ
3[
i=1
ni
∂Ei
∂ηj
= 0 j = 1, ..., k (5.3)
∂L
∂λ
=
3[
i=1
niEi(x, η)− x = 0 (5.4)
∂L
∂µi
= ui[x,mi −Ei(x, η)]− uoi = 0 i = 2, 3. (5.5)
The above equations define, in abstract form, necessary conditions for Pareto
eﬃciency given general cost functions Ei(x, η). To make these optimality con-
ditions more transparent, consider, for illustrative purposes, the case where the
parties agree on a linear cost sharing rule such that Ei(x, η) = τ ix. The above
first order conditions specialize to a seven equation system, characterizing the
optimum values of x and τ :
∂L
∂x
=
3[
i=1
µi

∂ui
∂x
− ∂ui
∂yi
τ i

+ λ
#
3[
i=1
niτ i − 1
$
= 0 (5.6)
∂L
∂τ j
= −µi
∂ui
∂yi
x+ λ
3[
i=1
nix = 0 j = 1, 2, 3 (5.7)
∂L
∂λ
=
3[
i=1
niτ ix− x = 0 = 0 (5.8)
∂L
∂µi
= ui[x,mi − τ ix]− uoi = 0 i = 2, 3. (5.9)
The solution to this problem is one where a first-best allocative eﬃciency is ob-
tained, i.e. a tangency on the contract curve in Figure 1.
3[
i=1
niΠi[x∗,mi −Ei(x∗, τ ∗i )] = 1 (5.10)
λ =
1
n1
∂u1
∂y1
(5.11)
µi =
ni
n1
∂u1/∂y1
∂ui/∂yi
i = 2, 3 (5.12)
Furthermore, for i = 2, 3 the welfare of the rich community increases in community
i’s income, but decreases in the welfare level community i secures for itself.
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If, again for illustrative purposes, we return to the two-country case (n1 =
n2 = 1 and n3 = 0), where both countries have quasi-linear preferences, we find
from (5.6)
γ
x
− τ + µ

β
x
− (1− τ)

= 0 (5.13)
while (5.7) entails µ = 1. The optimum thus has the same eﬃcient level of global
public activity as encountered before, namely x∗ = γ + β. From the participation
constraint (5.9), we obtain τ as a function of uo2 :
τ ∗ = 1−

β log x∗ +m2 − uo2
x∗

(5.14)
The above equation captures in a simple fashion several of the themes developed
in the paper, namely other things equal (i) country 1’s cost share decreases in m2
(and thus country 1’s welfare increases with m2), (ii) country 1’s cost share rises
in the utility uo2 country 2 will manage to secure itself, and finally (iii) country 1’s
cost share is decreasing in β, the free-rider’s valuation of the public good. We next
proceed to illustrate these findings with the help of a further calibration exercise.
In the calibrations of Table 2 we set m1 = 3, γ = 1 and β = 0.5 as in the
calibrations of Table 1, and we fix the income share of country 2 at θ2 = 0.25.
Our purpose here is to calculate the optimum cost-share τ ∗ and the welfare u1 of
country 1 as we vary uo2.We normalize the welfare level of both countries by their
reservation utilities (2.1) and (2.2), so that u2/u¯2 = 1 corresponds to a treaty
where all the welfare gains accrue to country 1, and u1/u¯1 = 1 corresponds to a
treaty where country 2 reaps all the welfare gains.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The results of the first row of Table 2 correspond to those of the first row of
Table 1 where xˆ = 1.50, sˆ = 0.46, tˆ = 0.20 and the developed country reaps all the
welfare gains. Likewise, the results of the fourth row of Table 2 where x˜ = 1.50,
s˜ = 0.75, t˜ = 0.09 are those where country 2 appropriates all the welfare gains
from the treaty. In the first row of Table 2, τ∗ = 0.86, whereas in the fourth
row, the cost share of country 1 rises to τ ∗ = 0.93. Between these two limiting
cases, there exist treaties that benefit both parties. In the third row for instance,
u1/u¯1 = 1.03, u2/u¯2 = 1.05 and country 1’s cost-share stands at τ ∗ = 0.90. We
can now quite simply envisage treaties that benefit both parties by continuously
varying u2/u¯2, while ensuring that the resulting value of τ ∗ remains between these
critical bounds of 0.86 and 0.93.
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6. Conclusions.
This paper describes international treaties that mobilise developing countries to
contribute to the provision of a global public good when developing countries can
free-ride on developed countries’ contributions to produce a global public good.
The ‘good’ news is that, even in the absence of an international authority (that
is able to tax nation states), international treaties are able to rely on ‘tax sub-
sidy’ arrangements to produce cost-sharing functions that will mobilise voluntary
collective action. When subsidies increase as output increases, subsidies can be
introduced to mobilise collective action.
The ‘bad’ news is that, international treaties that oﬀer subsidies to mobilise
collective action can be designed to deliver all of the eﬃciency gains to the coun-
tries that pay the subsidies. In the absence of an international authority to moni-
tor and to regulate the inducements implicit in these ‘tax subsidy’ arrangements,
international treaties may deliver all of the welfare gains to the ‘donor’ countries.
If it is a convention that the altruist oﬀers the subsidy, developed countries are
able to make the first move. They are at an institutional advantage. As ‘donors’
they set the subsidy. As ‘donors’ they oﬀer the tax-subsidy arrangement implicit
in an international treaty. They are able to set the subsidy to mobilise collective
action and to appropriate the eﬃciency gains. In the absence of regulation, inter-
national treaties that ‘generously’ oﬀer subsidies to mobilise collective action can
be designed to maximise the welfare of the nation states that pay the subsidies.
When considering the pattern of international subsidies it appears counter-
intuitive that developed countries might oﬀer higher subsidies to developing coun-
tries that have higher levels of income. This is at odds with expectations based on
the assumption that developed countries oﬀer subsidies to alleviate poverty. How-
ever, it is consistent with expectations premised on the assumption that developed
countries oﬀer subsidies to maximise their own welfare.
More generally it is possible to compare the properties of Pareto-eﬃcient
treaties that advantage some countries with the properties of Pareto-eﬃcient
treaties that advantage all of the nation states that act collectively. The cal-
ibrations in this paper (premised, albeit, on quasi-linear preferences) illustrate
the sensitivity of the distribution of welfare gains to changes in tax and subsidy
arrangements. The properties of these ‘tax subsidy’ arrangements are important
if policymakers are to ensure that every nation state receives a meaningful share
of the eﬃciency gains that they generate when they act collectively.
The conclusions in this paper are also relevant when analysing bilateral and
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multilateral aid arrangements. Critics have argued that, when these subsidies
displace conventional aid, the arrangements are ‘unethical’ and ‘ineﬃcient’ (e.g.
Anand 2006). One advantage of the analysis presented in this paper is that it is
possible to address each concern separately. There are ethical considerations even
when international treaties (and aid packages) achieve a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome.
While the analysis suggests that the developed countries that have already
complied with the Kyoto treaty will be able to oﬀer a subsidy that will encourage
developing countries to reduce carbon emissions (e.g. as discussed at the U.N.
Climate Conferences), it calls in question the impact that a subsidy will exert
on the distribution of the eﬃciency gains. It oﬀers a diﬀerent perspective on the
emphasis placed on encouraging commitments from middle-income developing
countries.
The analysis presented in this paper can be extended in diﬀerent ways, e.g.
(i) The analysis is premised on a summation technology (Sandler 2004) and
it is possible to compare the outcomes that would emerge if there were diﬀerent
technologies to produce a global public good (e.g. see Ihori 1996 and Jayaraman
and Kanbur 1999).
(ii) The paper explores the normative eﬀects of subsidies and these are impor-
tant if a political economy model is to be developed to analyse the pressures that
are likely to be exerted by diﬀerent groups in ‘donor’ countries and in ‘recipient’
countries. The gains reported in this paper are likely to be appropriated by groups
that are able to exert political influence (e.g. Jones 2006).
While many future developments are possible, the important message is that
the subsidies developed countries oﬀer to mobilise developing countries can also be
designed to appropriate the eﬃciency gains that are delivered by collective action.
It is far from obvious that international subsidies provide any meaningful assis-
tance to recipient countries. If policymakers ignore the possibilities illustrated in
this paper, ‘donors’ are able to employ international subsidies to help themselves,
rather than to help others.
7. Appendix
In this appendix we gather proofs of our main results.
Proof of Proposition 3.1 From (3.7), we have
∂u1
∂y1
= λ. Substituting for
∂u1
∂y1
in (3.6), we find that µm2
∂u2
∂y2
= λm2; viz. (3.10) . Finally, substituting for
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the marginal utilities of both countries’ incomes using (3.9-3.10) in the first order
condition (3.5), and dividing throughout by λ, we obtain the Samuelson condition
(3.8). 
Proof of Corollary 3.2 v1(m1,m2, u¯2) is a maximum value function for the
problem (3.4), where both Lagrange multipliers are strictly positive. From the
envelope theorem we readily obtain:
∂v1
∂m2
=
∂L
∂m2
= µ
∂u2
∂y2
(1− tˆ) + λtˆ (7.1)
From (3.10) µ
∂u2
∂y2
= λ. Hence
∂v1
∂m2
= λ(1 − tˆ) + λtˆ = λ as required. This
establishes (i).
Applying the envelope theorem a second time we have
∂v1
∂u¯2
=
∂L
∂u¯2
= −µ (7.2)
Thus (ii) is also proven. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3 Consider the Lagrangian associated with the
multi-country model. This would take the form:
L = n1u1 (x,m1(1− t)− sx) +
+
n2[
i=1
µ∗i [u2 (x,m2(1− t))− u¯2]
+λ [t (n1m1 + n2m2)− x (1− n1s)] (7.3)
We note that whatever allocation

xˆ, tˆ, sˆ

maximizes ku1 (x, y1) (where k > 0),
also maximizes u1 (x, y1) . Furthermore, we define µ =
Sn2
i=1 µ
∗
i . Thus, the point
xˆ, tˆ, sˆ

solution to the above Lagrangian is also solution to (3.12).
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Figure 1.  Mobilising Collective Action
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Table 1 All the welfare gains accrue to the developed country 
 
 
2θ  sˆ  tˆ  xˆ  
0.25 0.46 0.20 1.50 
0.33 0.59 0.14 1.50 
0.50 0.73 0.07 1.50 
 
 
 
Notes :   
 
1) γ=1 , β=0.5  and m1= 3 in all calibrations 
 
2) θ2  is the income share of country 2 in the world distribution of income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Pareto efficient linear cost-sharing international treaty 
 
 
22 / uu   x* τ∗ 11 / uu  
1.00 1.5 0.86 1.05 
1.03 1.5 0.88 1.04 
1.05 1.5 0.90 1.03 
1.10 1.5 0.93 1.00 
 
 
Notes :   
1) γ=1, β=0.5, m1=3  and θ2=0.25 in all calculations. 
2) ii u/u is the welfare gain of country i measured as a ratio of its reservation utility. 
 
